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Abstract
This chapter reviews four books published in 2018 which are not readily
categorized as works in ‘modern European philosophy’: Gurminder K.
Bhambra, Kerem Nis ancloğlu, and Dalia Gebrial’s edited volume Decolonising
the University, Chantal Mouffe’s For a Left Populism, Cinzia Arruzza, Tithi
Bhattacharya, and Nancy Fraser’s Feminism for the 99%, and Andreas Malm’s
The Progress of this Storm. Yet their uneasy relationship to this philosophy is
precisely the reason they constitute a significant contribution to it. The philo-
sophical originality and critical purchase of these books proceed from the fact
that each is a singular case of philosophy’s dependence on ‘non-philosophy’;
each exposes the impossibility of viewing philosophy as a self-sufficient discip-
line. In particular, they are a timely reminder that the best political philosophy
is produced through actually existing social movements to change (which
ecologically now means simply saving) the world. The chapter is divided
into six sections: 1. Introduction; 2. Decolonizing Philosophy: Decolonising
the University; 3. Anti-Post-Politics: For a Left Populism; 4. Anti-Post-Marxism:
Feminism for the 99%; 5. Anti-Postmodernism: The Progress of This Storm; 6.
Conclusion.
1. Introduction
In last year’s modern European philosophy chapter for the YWCCT, Lucie
Mercier and I took the occasion of two significant anniversaries within
Marxism (150 years since the publication of Marx’s Capital and 100 years
since the Russian Revolution) to revisit the meaning of ‘Marxist philosophy’,
insofar as this philosophy remains tethered to the intractable question of its
very possibility. Each in its own way, the works we examined exemplified
the twofold tension at the heart of ‘Marxist philosophy’: first with
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transformative political practice, and second with the history of philosophy.
Marxism has and will always have an unsettled relationship with philosophy:
simultaneously inside and outside philosophy, it constitutes a host of prob-
lems for philosophy that, more often than not, can only be articulated with
philosophy. This deeply ambiguous situation has prompted some Marxists,
such as Georges Labica, to state that Marx’s ‘science of history’ (his materi-
alism) relegates all philosophy to ideology, rendering the notion of a ‘Marxist
philosophy’ absurd, whereas it incited others, such as Herbert Marcuse, to
contend that Marx allows us to realize philosophy as a concrete mode of
human existence, one which makes visible the distress of our contemporary
moment.
This year’s chapter reframes, modifies, and expands this problematic.
Like last year’s, it considers what might be called the ‘philosophy–non-phil-
osophy relationship’: all four books under consideration here generate sub-
stantial and provocative philosophical insights because they are not
(commonly construed) philosophical works. This point is not made to
appeal to inter- and cross-disciplinarity. Rather, the point is that
Decolonising the University philosophizes more about education, For a Left
Populism and Feminism for the 99% more about politics, and The Progress of
This Storm more about mind and environment than the majority of works in
2018 in the philosophy of education, political philosophy, and so on, by
virtue of their immanence to the concrete distress of their historical presents.
In this sense, this chapter agrees with Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s
What Is Philosophy? (1996), but on the condition that the ‘non-philosophical’
and ‘non-philosopher’ are explicitly understood as bearers of transformative
political practice: ‘The non-philosophical is perhaps closer to the heart of
philosophy than philosophy itself [. . .] the philosopher must become non-
philosopher, so that non-philosophy becomes the ground and the people of
philosophy’ (What Is Philosophy?, pp. 41, 109). This is all the more crucial
with modern European philosophy: the future relevance of this field is bound
to the non-philosophical, not because this practical wellspring will help
secure its European status, but because it has the potential to foster its
destruction. The future of philosophy hinges on its decolonization, and
the fight against neoliberalism—thematized by all of these books—is part
and parcel of this.
2. Decolonizing Philosophy: Decolonising the University
Decolonising the University is an edited collection that brings together nineteen
different authors doing decolonial work within the ‘home of the coloniser’.
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The result is an impressive volume that reflects seriously, but encouragingly,
on the current state of decolonizing work to transform the Western neo-
liberal university. It is grounded by a series of concrete political and peda-
gogical agendas and strategies, guided by the need ‘to question the
epistemological authority assigned uniquely to the Western university as
the privileged site of knowledge production and to contribute to the broader
project of decolonising through a discussion of strategies and interventions
emanating from within the imperial metropoles’ (p. 3). Gurminder K.
Bhambra, Dalia Gebrial, and Kerem Nis anc|oğlu use their introduction to
insist on a decolonial politics based in various forms of anti-racist critique
and activism. They situate their argument in the imperative, after Eve Tuck
and K. Wayne Yang, to go beyond ‘‘‘decolonization as a metaphor’’’, but are
also careful to problematize any substantive claims which might reduce
decolonial rubrics ‘to a historically specific and geographically particular
articulation of the colonial project’ (pp. 4–5).
As is to be demanded from a text that is grounded in plurality and
positionality, individual chapters vary greatly in terms of scope, method-
ology, epistemology, and tone, but they are held together by a shared com-
mitment to transformative political practice. The false idol of diversification
comes in for particular scrutiny in many of the chapters; for instance,
Rosalba Icaza and Rolando Vázquez maintain that ‘[t]he ‘‘exhibition’’ of di-
versity is another form of exclusion’ (p. 118). Another unifying theme is the
unrelenting push of the Western neoliberal university towards marketization,
financialization, opaque manageriality, and increased reliance on precarious
and exploited labour. In particular, John Holmwood takes a detailed look
such changes in US and UK higher education, charting the rise and intensi-
fication of the neoliberal model. Holmwood contrasts current market-gov-
erned Western institutions with ‘the public university’ grounded in public
goods and social rights. He stresses the evolution of university education as
primarily an ‘individual choice’—i.e. a personal investment in making one-
self more marketable. These developments, he argues, are ‘not neutral with
regard to issues of race and ethnicity’ (p. 44). Holmwood ultimately makes
the point that it is precisely the claim to ‘race blindness’ which allows the
neoliberal university to perpetuate structural racism. He pays particular
attention to inclusions of overseas students and changes to fees/funding
that use claims of formalized equality to conceal the drive for increased
profit and maintain existing racialized structural inequalities. In short, ‘per-
sonal responsibility is the ideology that maintains the status quo, not the
means of challenging it’ (pp. 43–47).
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Similar themes are examined by Angela Last. She analyses ‘internation-
alization’ as both a tactical broadening of the student market by metropole
institutions and a mode of demonstrating ‘research excellence’ (inevitably
measured by reductive criteria). She discusses the difficulties of international
academic research and publishing, contending that, amongst other imperial
tendencies, academics in both the global North and South face continued
pressures to publish within the global North (p. 209). An increased demand
for (fashionable and marketable) transregional and interdisciplinary projects
is accompanied by unreasonable individual publication and financial targets
rendering truly collaborative decolonizing work almost impossible (p. 217).
It is through a recourse to ‘care’ that Last offers some possibilities for
resistance and change (pp. 118–224).
The opening chapter, by Gebrial, is a case study of the recent campaign at
Oxford University to remove the statue of the imperialist and racist magnate
Cecil Rhodes from a university building. Uniting behind this demand, cam-
paigners stood in solidarity with the 2015 movement to remove a Rhodes
statue from South Africa’s Oriel College, from which they took the name
Rhodes Must Fall. The overview of the Rhodes Must Fall Oxford (RMFO)
campaign in Decolonising the University highlights the privileged place granted
to the mainstream media, over and above any discussion of debates internal
to the institution. In doing so, Gebrial draws out the irony of one primary
reaction to RMFO—the levelling of accusations of censorship against the
movement: ‘where great concern was expressed over whether the removal
and recontextualization of Rhodes’s statue would erase ‘‘history’’, little curi-
osity was ever shown towards what histories were and continue to be sup-
pressed by the statue’s very existence as a glorifying tribute’ (p. 27).
Rosalba Icaza and Rolando Vázquez share their experiences of decolo-
nializing diversity initiatives at the University of Amsterdam. They offer a
useful analytic framework for thinking through and carrying out decolonizing
research through pedagogies of ‘positionality’, ‘participation’, and ‘transi-
tion’ (pp. 119–20). A similar theme is taken up by Carol Azumah Dennis,
who explores the under-studied relationship between the political and the
pedagogical by insisting on the continuity between them (pp. 190–202).
Dennis speaks of ‘invading the space of the ‘‘unmarked scholar’’’ (p. 192),
and draws upon Ubuntu pedagogy in order to reflect on how we might
ground education as ‘‘‘knowledge-as-intervention-in-reality’’, not ‘‘know-
ledge-as-a-representation-of-reality’’’ (pp. 201–02). Concluding with ten
action points, her opening recommendation for decolonizing pedagogy is
to ‘establish a space within which it is possible to speak about decolonisation.
This may require a rejection of the most readily and easily available spaces,









bz012/5540348 by guest on 07 August 2019
necessitating the deliberate cultivation of an undercommons, or an otherwise
space’ (p. 202). The double movement of infiltration of the institution and
departure from its self-defined boundary is evident in other chapters of
Decolonising the University. For example, in ‘Asylum University’, Kolar
Aparna and Olivier Kramsch provide a rich discussion of marginality through
their experiences of engaging the refugee community in, through, and
beyond the university (pp. 93–105).
For our direct purposes, Decolonising the University is crucial for three
reasons. First, the editors single out modern European philosophy as the
only academic discipline to receive (or, better, to require) a dedicated chap-
ter; second, whereas philosophy should be the disciplinary home for a meta-
critique of knowledge production, Decolonising the University clearly demon-
strates that it is not; and third, an array of concepts emerges from this
volume which contain a wealth of philosophical potential, but which are
either underdeveloped or outright neglected within the modern European
philosophical canon. These concepts include the aforementioned ‘ubuntu’
(Dennis), ‘asylum’ (as a philosophical lens of interpretation), ‘openness’
(interrogated in terms of pedagogical practices), Sylvia Wynter’s conception
of the ‘demonic ground’, Enrique Dussel’s notion of ‘analectics’, ‘storytell-
ing’ (as an indigenizing and decolonizing pedagogic method), ‘undone sci-
ence’ (used to reframe colonial violence and institutional racism from
outside academic thought), ‘refusal’ (a strategy imbued with power and
nuance), and, as previously mentioned, the ‘unmarked scholar’.
In their chapter ‘Decolonising Philosophy’, Nelson Maldonado-Torres,
Rafael Vizcaı́no, Jasmine Wallace, and Jeong Eun Annabel We explore pos-
sible avenues for new philosophical production, particularly through contri-
butions from Asian and Latin American philosophical traditions. They begin
their chapter by arguing that specific scrutiny of philosophy is warranted
because ‘[it] remains a bastion of Eurocentrism, whiteness in general, and
white heteronormative male structural privilege and superiority in particu-
lar’; hence, ‘it becomes all the more necessary not simply to diversify phil-
osophy, but to decolonise it’ (pp. 64–65). Uncoincidentally, philosophy
maintains a seemingly ‘special place among the discourses in the liberal
arts because it focuses on the roots of the university at large: reason’ (p.
66). The ‘sanctity’ of modern European philosophy is fuelled by the privilege
accorded to it as the ground of knowledge production, rendering its decol-
onization all the more urgent, and yet it was, from the nineteenth century
onwards, at the vanguard of bracketing various ‘decolonial [turns] [. . .] that
challenged modernity/coloniality’ (p. 68), choosing instead to give other
‘turns’, such as the transcendental, linguistic, and phenomenological, pride
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of place on the intellectual and political horizon. This was later exacerbated
by the continental/analytic ‘split’ in philosophy, wherein adherents to the
former, especially Marxists, found themselves excluded from Anglo-
American philosophy departments during and after the Cold War, leaving
the disciples of the latter, with their fetishization of formal logic, the perfect
custodians (to this day) of resistance against decolonization.
Maldonado-Torres, Vizcaı́no, Wallace, and We demonstrate how
European colonization laid the groundwork for ‘philosophical production
in Latin America [being] often looked at as if it is either too indistinguishable
from European thought, although dependent and inferior, or too different
and exotic (especially Indigenous philosophies), to the point where it is not
taken as legitimate philosophy’ (p. 75). The importance of Dussel’s afore-
mentioned concept of ‘analectics’ is that, as an essential register of Latin
American liberation philosophy, it constitutes a ‘serious attempt to dwell in
the constitutive outside of modernity’ (p. 76). It has the capacity, therefore,
to decolonize philosophy, insofar as it departs from ‘the zone of violence and
ontological erasure’ of the colonial ‘underside of modernity’ (p. 77). Yet far
from privileging a ‘pure position of exteriority’ (p. 76), the analectic
method—demonstrated by its confrontation with, for instance, Frankfurt
school critical theory—generates new, transdisciplinary forms of knowledge
because it unavoidably ‘dislodges’ modern European philosophy ‘from the
very start’ (p. 79). It is not anti-dialectical per se, but rather dialectically
enriches ‘dialectics [. . .] with ‘‘the affirmation of the Exteriority of the
Other’’’, which carries with it the possibility of a truly other world’ (p.
77). In other words, analectics discloses that decolonizing philosophy is a
necessarily transdisciplinary struggle: it requires modern European philoso-
phy to ‘engage in an open dialogue with other geographies of reason’ (p. 79).
Decolonising the University is consequently a significant philosophical contri-
bution to the non-philosophical.
3. Anti-Post-Politics: For a Left Populism
For a Left Populism charts a different (patently Eurocentric, first of all) route.
It is an unmistakable descendant of the political philosophy which Chantal
Mouffe, with Ernesto Laclau, introduced in their acclaimed Hegemony and
Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (1985). Indeed, For a Left
Populism should be read as the Hegemony and Socialist Strategy for the early
twenty-first century, when neoliberalism is not only consolidated as the
global predominant political and economic ideology, but is now historical
enough to have been beset by a series of systemic crises, largely of its own
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making. Following Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, For a Left Populism is driven
by an appeal to overcome the ‘essentialist perspective dominant in left
thinking’; Marxism’s ‘class essentialism’ (p. 2) is the clear target here. For
a Left Populism, like Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, is therefore a decidedly,
and unapologetically, post-Marxist piece of political philosophy: the thirty-
three years separating these two works have done little to make Mouffe
waver in her commitment to a political discourse analysis based in post-
structuralism, coupled with a singular appropriation of the concept of ‘he-
gemony’ at the core of Antonio Gramsci’s philosophy.
Both works are purportedly guided by an ‘alternative ‘‘anti-essentialist’’
approach apt to grasp the multiplicity of struggles against different forms of
domination’, struggles whose overriding political character is best grasped as
a ‘radicalization of democracy’ (p. 2). This radicalization—an ‘emancipatory
project’ for Mouffe—departs in significant ways from traditional socialist
(Marxist) political projects. It rejects the notion that the state must be
eliminated (p. 3), and not only accepts but embraces the liberal-democratic
philosophical tradition, albeit in a highly modified form: economic liberalism
and its grounding in capitalism are scrapped, but political liberalism and its
ideals of freedom, equality, and popular sovereignty are to be rescued from
neoliberalism’s ongoing assault on them. This rescue will in turn yield a
transformation of these ideals. Mouffe is not calling for a simple return to
the postwar consensus between capital and labour (p. 52); the radicalization
of democracy is more than a return to the Keynesian welfare nation-state.
Against the contemporary ‘post-political’ conjuncture underwritten and
enforced by neoliberalism, where ‘rational’ policies are elaborated by
technocratic experts (p. 4) wedded to the ongoing march of privatization
and financialization, and expressly against the various right-wing populisms
offering false solutions to the crises born of neoliberalism, Mouffe insists on
‘the need to break with the post-political consensus and to reaffirm the
partisan nature of politics in order to create the conditions of an ‘‘agonistic’’
debate about possible alternatives’ (p. 5). Neoliberalism and its crises have
created a new historical conjuncture—a populist moment—which has, to
date, been dominated by the right. It is thus imperative to establish a left
alternative—a ‘left populism’—‘understood as a discursive strategy of con-
struction of the political frontier between ‘‘the people’’ and ‘‘the oligarchy’’’
which ‘around democracy as the hegemonic signifier, [creates] a chain of
equivalence among the manifold struggles against subordination’ (pp. 5–6).
Determinate empirico-social categories—first and foremost ‘class’—no
longer hold pride of place. Instead, a ‘left populism’ is a fundamentally
‘transversal’ movement that understands ‘the people’ as ‘a discursive
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construction resulting from a ‘‘chain of equivalence’’ between heterogeneous
demands whose unity is secured by the identification with a radical demo-
cratic conception of citizenship and a common opposition to the oligarchy’
(p. 80).
Neoliberalism is transforming the contemporary historical moment into a
post-democratic era, one that ‘[erodes] the two pillars of the democratic
ideal: equality and popular sovereignty’ (p. 13). In short, the defining feature
of post-democracy is the collapse of the agonistic relationship between pol-
itical liberalism (rule of law, separation of powers, and individual freedoms)
and the democratic tradition (equality, popular sovereignty) (p. 14). The
constitutive tension between these two traditions—which ‘defines the ori-
ginality of liberal democracy as a politeia, a form of political community, that
guarantees its pluralistic character’ (p. 15)—is being torn asunder by
neoliberalism:
The current situation can be described as ‘post-democracy’ because
in recent years, as a consequence of neoliberal hegemony, the ag-
onistic tension between the liberal and democratic principles, which
is constitutive of liberal democracy, has been eliminated. With the
demise of the democratic values of equality and popular sovereignty,
the agonistic spaces where different projects of society could confront
each other have disappeared and citizens have been deprived of the
possibility of exercising their democratic rights. To be sure, ‘dem-
ocracy’ is still spoken of, but it has been reduced to its liberal
component and it only signifies the presence of free elections and the
defence of human rights. What has become increasingly central is
economic liberalism with its defence of the free market, and many
aspects of political liberalism have been relegated to second place,
if not simply eliminated. This is what I mean by ‘post-democracy’.
(p. 16)
A left populism—which today can be seen in Greece’s Syriza, Spain’s
Podemos, and Britain’s Labour—must learn how to articulate a response to
today’s post-democratic situation, and do so in a way that exposes its fun-
damental difference from right populism, a difference which ‘lies in the
composition of the ‘‘we’’ and in how the adversary, the ‘‘they’’, is defined’
(p. 23). The difference between right and left populism comes down to the
fact that the latter ‘wants to recover democracy to deepen and extend it’
(p. 24).
How do we realize a democratic-emancipatory transition from neo-
liberalism? Mouffe points in a very surprising direction in order to answer
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this question: Margaret Thatcher. Again echoing Hegemony and Socialist
Strategy (written during the height of Thatcher’s neoliberal offensive),
Mouffe suggests that the constitution of a new historical bloc (Gramsci),
one that would realize a new hegemonic radicalization of democracy, might
follow the strategic example set by Thatcherism in the early 1980s, wherein
established social-democratic values were successfully uprooted—‘discur-
sively reconfigured’—by the new common sense (Gramsci) of individual
liberty (Friedrich Hayek was Thatcher’s philosophical inspiration) (pp. 30–
31). Within the span of just a few years, ‘the idea of democracy [became]
secondary to the idea of individual liberty’ (p. 31), with the extent of the
consent manufactured within the British public exemplified by the near-
wholesale acceptance of the neoliberal model by Tony Blair and ‘New
Labour’ by the 1990s (Thatcher famously stated that this was her greatest
achievement) (p. 32).
For Mouffe, we should ‘learn from’ and ‘follow’ (p. 35) Thatcher’s
route, ‘adopting a populist strategy, but this time with a progressive object-
ive, intervening on a multiplicity of fronts to build a new hegemony aiming
at recovering and deepening democracy’ (p. 35). ‘This’, she maintains, ‘will
necessitate a far-reaching transformation of the existing relations of power
and the creation of new democratic practices, but I contend that it does not
require a ‘‘revolutionary’’ break with the liberal-democratic regime’ (p. 36).
Indeed, revolution is unequivocally ruled out as a means of radicalizing
democracy throughout For a Left Populism (Mouffe unambiguously ‘rejects
the false dilemma between reform and revolution’ (p. 45)). What is instead
necessary is democracy’s ‘recovery’ (p. 37) from its command and perver-
sion by neoliberalism, and thereby the restoration of the agonistic tension of
politics itself.
Precisely what Mouffe means by ‘radicalizing democracy’—or more
specifically, the ‘radicalization’ of the ‘ethico-political principles’ of liberal
democracy, ‘liberty and equality for all’ (p. 39)—is again animated by the
non-/anti-revolutionary position which she and Laclau first articulated in
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (for her, ‘revolution’ is synonymous with the
‘total refoundation’ (p. 40) and ‘total rupture’ (p. 46) of the prevailing
hegemonic order). Radicalizing democracy denotes the ‘fight for [the] ef-
fective implementation’ of freedom, equality, and popular sovereignty
‘through an immanent critique that mobilizes the symbolic resources of
the democratic tradition’ (p. 40). The ‘role played by the signifier ‘‘democ-
racy’’ in the political imaginary’ (p. 41) is of tantamount importance: it
functions as the ‘discursive ‘‘exterior’’ from which the discourse of subor-
dination can be interrupted’ (p. 42), and, when restored alongside its
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rightful identity with equal rights, will ‘command a very different politics
and inform different socioeconomic practices than when democracy was
articulated with the free market, private property and unfettered individu-
alism’ (p. 44). The objective is not ‘the seizure of state power but, as Gramsci
put it, one of ‘‘becoming state’’’, such that ‘radicalizing democracy’ is in fact
an engagement ‘with the diverse state apparatuses in order to transform
them, so as to make the state a vehicle for the expression of the manifold of
democratic demands’ (p. 47). ‘What is important [. . .] is the recognition
that ‘‘democracy’’ is the hegemonic signifier around which [. . .] diverse
struggles are articulated and that political liberalism is not discarded’ (p.
51). In other words, there is for Mouffe ‘no necessary relationship between
capitalism and liberal democracy’, ‘no reason to assume that the working
class has an a priori privileged role in the anti-capitalist struggle’ (pp. 48–49).
‘Indeed, there are no a priori privileged places in the anti-capitalist struggle’
(p. 48), which, as we will see, stands in clear opposition to the arguments of
Arruzza, Bhattacharya, and Fraser’s Feminism for the 99% and Malm’s The
Progress of This Storm (on the condition that any ‘a priori’ is already always
understood, after Michel Foucault, as a historical a priori).
Anyone familiar with Mouffe’s work is familiar with the influence
wielded by poststructuralism and Gramsci’s political philosophy (to be
clear, Mouffe’s ‘Gramsci’ is shorn of his dedication to Marxist—commun-
ist—revolution, registered by the political concept of hegemony). For a Left
Populism is no exception: the conceptual presence of ‘discursive construc-
tions’ and ‘imbrications’ of multiple social agents in plural and competing
power relations, and thereby hegemonic projects situated in different his-
torical blocs, is palpable. But in order to realize the full range of philosoph-
ical influences on For a Left Populism, and with it on Mouffe’s work more
generally, it is necessary to cast light on other figures (both acknowledged
and not) which play a decisive role. When, for instance, Mouffe argues for
the centrality of representation to the ‘radicalization of democracy’ (e.g.
‘representative institutions play a crucial role’ in fostering the ‘conflictual
dimension’ of politics (p. 55), or a ‘pluralist democratic society which does
not envisage pluralism in a harmonious anti-political form and where the
ever-present possibility of antagonism is acknowledged cannot exist without
representation’ (p. 56)), it is impossible not to detect the ‘battleground of
ideas’ of Max Weber’s political philosophy, and, more fundamentally, the
friend/enemy distinction at the heart of Carl Schmitt’s (who, curiously, is
only mentioned in passing at the beginning of For a Left Populism). To state
that ‘it is urgent to restore the agonistic dynamics constitutive of a vibrant
democracy’ (p. 56), or that ‘agonistic confrontation [. . .] is the very
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condition of a vibrant democracy’ (pp. 56–57), is to reproduce, albeit in a
modified form, the theoretical function of Schmitt’s friend/enemy
distinction.
This is evidenced by Mouffe’s appendix, ‘An Agonistic Conception of
Democracy’, with its construction of a conceptual difference between ‘agon-
ism’ and ‘antagonism’. Mouffe undeniably inverts Schmitt’s position on lib-
eral pluralism: for Schmitt, liberalism is the depoliticizing discourse par
excellence as it denies the friend/enemy distinction, whereas for Mouffe
democratic pluralism is necessarily conflictual—and therefore political—be-
cause it institutionalizes ‘an adversary whose existence is perceived as legit-
imate’ (p. 91). Yet this inversion is still predicated on an ontological baseline
(somewhat supra-historical, which threatens the historicity of her avowed
‘anti-essentialism’) of a ‘we’/ they’ distinction which is unmistakably
Schmittian: ‘the necessarily conflictual nature of pluralism’ (p. 92), the
‘ineradicability of antagonism’ (p. 93), the ‘political frontier separating the
‘‘we’’ from the ‘‘they’’’ as ‘decisive in the construction of a ‘‘people’’’ (p. 63),
and so forth. Indeed, the concept of the ‘citizen’—central to Mouffe’s
project to radicalize democracy—is unintelligible in isolation from the ag-
onistic confrontation.
In contrast to her unacknowledged dependence on Weber and Schmitt,
Mouffe explicitly recognizes and engages other philosophical sources in her
construction of ‘the people’ for left populism. Following her discussion of
the ‘libidinal investment at work in national [. . .] forms of identification’ (p.
71), and hence the need to start at the level of the nation-state when
radicalizing democracy, Mouffe draws on Sigmund Freud in order to high-
light the importance of affect in the construction of political identities
(indeed subjectivity more generally), invokes Baruch Spinoza’s distinction
between affection (affectio) and affect (affectus) in his Ethics to account for the
‘motor of political action’ (p. 74), and suggests that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s
philosophy of the inscription of discursive practices into language reveals that
the allegiance to democratic values is as much, if not more, predicated on
affective identification as it is on rational argumentation (p. 75). Building on
previous summations of left populism that thematized hegemony (Gramsci)
and agonism (Schmitt), we are now presented with a clearly affective
articulation:
A left populist strategy aims at the crystallization of a collective will
sustained by common affects aspiring for a more democratic order.
This requires the creation of a different regime of desire and affects
through inscription in discursive/affective practices that will bring
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about new forms of identification [. . .] practices that would erode the
common affects that sustain the neoliberal hegemony and create the
conditions for a radicalization of democracy. (pp. 76–77)
This and the other summations of left populism share one common
thread: ‘post-Marxism’. For a Left Populism is shot through with suspicion
of ‘class’ as a useful analytical or empirical category (coupled with depictions
of new social movements as not class-based), reductions of the concept of
‘revolution’ to ‘total refoundation’ and ‘total rupture’, defences of the state,
and the prioritization of ‘ideas’ over ‘material determinants’ (p. 75). It is not
named, but it is perfectly clear what the overarching object of this critique is:
[The ‘extreme left’] do not engage with how people are in reality, but
with how they should be according to their theories. As a result, they
see their role as making them realise the ‘truth’ about their situation.
Instead of designating the adversaries in ways that people can identify,
they use abstract categories like ‘capitalism’, thereby failing to mo-
bilize the affective dimension necessary to motivate people to act
politically. They are in fact insensitive to people’s effective demands.
Their anti-capitalist rhetoric does not find any echo in the groups
whose interests they pretend to represent. This is why they always
remain in marginal positions. (p. 50)
Left populism, it would seem, is not simply post-Marxist, but a deter-
minate form of anti-Marxism.
4. Anti-Post-Marxism: Feminism for the 99%
One is hard pressed to find a more forceful rebuttal to Mouffe than Feminism
for the 99%: A Manifesto. Cinzia Arruzza, Tithi Bhattacharya, and Nancy
Fraser’s urgent and unflinching political statement launches with its declar-
ation of a ‘crisis of epochal proportions’ (p. 13) and the failure of critical
movements, including multiple strands of feminism, to adequately respond
to it. They choose the manifesto as their literary form—concise, broadly
accessible, and marshalling—and explicitly place their words in dialogue
with Marx and Engels’s Communist Manifesto in a theoretically rich postface.
As with the Communist Manifesto, Feminism for the 99% insists that we attack
the root of the problem: it unapologetically identifies capitalism as ‘the
ultimate basis of oppression in modern society’ (p. 59). The authors
ground their understanding of the current crisis in its capitalist, systemic
nature, arguing that ‘although present calamities and sufferings are horrific,
what justifies our use of the term ‘‘crisis’’ is something more: the numerous
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harms we experience today are neither mutually unrelated nor products of
chance’ (p. 63). In short, today’s crisis is the product of a system and that
system can be named.
The manifesto form enables Arruzza, Bhattacharya, and Fraser to map a
complex landscape of interrelated problems without losing pace or getting
lost in detailed analysis. Inspired by Marx’s eleven Theses on Feuerbach (where
he outlines his reformulation of the concept of materialism), they present
their manifesto in eleven theses that outline current conflicts and what is
demanded of a new feminism. Presented here, without commentary, these
are:
Thesis 1: A new feminist wave is reinventing the strike.
Thesis 2: Liberal feminism is bankrupt. It’s time to get over it.
Thesis 3: We need an anticapitalist feminism—a feminism for the 99
percent.
Thesis 4: What we are living through is a crisis of society as a
whole—and its root cause is capitalism.
Thesis 5: Gender oppression in capitalist societies is rooted in the
subordination of social reproduction to production for profit. We
want to turn things right side up.
Thesis 6: Gender violence takes many forms, all of them entangled
with capitalist social relations. We vow to fight them all.
Thesis 7: Capitalism tries to regulate sexuality. We want to
liberate it.
Thesis 8: Capitalism was born from racist and colonial violence.
Feminism for the 99 percent is anti-racist and anti-imperialist.
Thesis 9: Fighting to reverse capital’s destruction of the earth,
feminism for the 99 percent is eco-socialist.
Thesis 10: Capitalism is incompatible with real democracy and peace.
Our answer is feminist internationalism.
Thesis 11: Feminism for the 99 percent calls on all radical move-
ments to join together in a common anticapitalist insurgency. (pp. 6,
10, 13, 16, 20, 25, 33, 40, 46, 49, 54)
The introduction and first two theses of Feminism for the 99% stage a
confrontation between the new feminism animating recent anti-capitalist
politics and liberal feminism. Arruzza, Bhattacharya, and Fraser argue that
‘although it condemns ‘‘discrimination’’ and advocates ‘‘freedom of choice,’’
liberal feminism steadfastly refuses to address the socioeconomic constraints
that make freedom and empowerment impossible for the large majority of
women’ (p. 11). Formal, legal equalities foregrounded by liberal feminism
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are, on their own, little but empty obfuscations of existing unequal power
structures. Without provisions for accessible, not-for-profit public services,
living wages, labour rights, and the valorization of care work, the demands of
liberal feminism are ‘fully compatible with ballooning inequality’ (p. 11).
Taking full advantage of the rhetorical power of the manifesto, the authors
brand liberal feminism with an overtly provocative characterization: ‘equal
opportunity domination’ (p. 2).
Problematizing the distinction between private and public gender vio-
lence, Arruzza, Bhattacharya, and Fraser also discredit ‘carceral feminist’
responses to sexual violence which rely on a ‘mistaken assumption that the
laws, police, and courts maintain sufficient autonomy from the capitalist
power structures to counter its deep-seated tendency to generate gender
violence’ (p. 29). They remind us that violence is endemic to capitalism and
functions to the benefit of capital, sustaining an essentially coercive system in
mutually reinforcing ways, whether it is expressed in intimate partner vio-
lence or the public weaponization of rape. Without unearthing these rela-
tions, a carceral feminist response only exacerbates other inequalities that
perpetuate such violence, not least by disproportionately targeting vulner-
able communities. ‘One form of violence cannot be stopped without stop-
ping the others’ (p. 33).
At the heart of Feminism for the 99% is what has come to be known as
‘Social Reproduction Theory’ (SRT), the theoretical framework of some of
the most innovative scholarship in Marxism and feminism today. Drawing on
insights and empirical research from across the arts, humanities, and social
sciences, SRT not only stresses that the reproduction of capitalism as a whole
(how Marx understands ‘social reproduction’) is predicated on countless
‘life-making’ activities and institutions outside of the direct capitalist pro-
duction-process, such as unpaid domestic labour and the family (Marxist
feminists have long established this), but contends that, because of this,
we must reframe, modify, and expand our understanding of basic categories,
such as labour and class, so as to effectively capture—and contest—the
complex and dynamic totality that is capitalism. In this sense, to take one
example, much of the recent feminist literature on unwaged affective/emo-
tional labour is a vital contribution to our understanding of productive
labour; it puts to rest the old, and wholly unproductive, Marxist category
of ‘unproductive labour’. The category of ‘class’ is thereby transformed.
Quoting Bhattacharya, ‘the working class [. . .] must be perceived as every-
one in the producing class who has in their lifetime participated in the
totality of reproduction of society—irrespective of whether that labour
has been paid for by capital or remained unpaid’ (Tithi Bhattacharya, ed.,
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Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression, p. 89).
Suffice to say, this passage, and Feminism for the 99%, is not guilty of
Mouffe’s charge of ‘class essentialism’.
In the body of the manifesto, the authors thus refer to ‘distinctively
‘‘modern’’ forms of sexism’ (p. 21) in capitalist societies, forms secured
by the incessant severing of profit-making work from all other necessary
labour, namely people-making activities. In capitalism, the latter are system-
ically subordinated to the former. Feminism for the 99% establishes the fact
that social reproduction is an indelibly feminist issue, as ‘in a capitalist
society, the organization of social reproduction rests on gender; it relies on gender
roles and entrenches gender oppression’ (p. 22). Our contemporary crisis is
fundamentally a crisis of social reproduction: capitalism’s valorization of
profit-making work over people-making work, epitomized by neoliberalism’s
increasing refusal to fund—let alone recognize the need for—care institu-
tions, is ‘systematically depleting our collective and individual capacities to
regenerate human beings and to sustain social bonds’ (p. 73).
Feminism for the 99% resolutely announces its solidarity with other anti-
capitalist movements. The manifesto demands a feminism that is in thought
and action necessarily anti-racist, anti-imperialist, internationalist, environ-
mentalist, universalist, and pro-labour rights. Hence Thesis 8 unpacks the
shared history, common foundation, and mutually reinforcing dynamics of
racist and sexist control and violence, but also, importantly, recognizes the
‘shameful history’ of race erasure and racist tropes within the history of
feminism (p. 42). Seeking to both remedy this erasure and also expose the
roots of and links between misogynist and racist oppression, Feminism for the
99% stands firmly in solidarity with (anti-capitalist) anti-racist and anti-im-
perialist movements in ways that resist ‘abstract proclamations of global
sisterhood’ (p. 45).
The transdisciplinary fabric of Arruzza, Bhattacharya, and Fraser’s inter-
vention is promising for modern European philosophy. For instance, it would
be interesting to investigate the philosophical concept of ‘life’ within the
terms of SRT, and, at the same time, consider how SRT stands to be critically
enriched when it is forced to reckon with this concept—from Hegel’s ‘idea’
to various biopolitical discourses—insofar as this concept may offer SRT with
new theoretical and empirical domains heretofore unexplored. The same
could be said of the philosophical concept of violence. The movement of
Feminism for the 99% uses a repeated motif of double refusal, at once the
refusal of two polarized options and the refusal of that very polarization.
Neoliberalism is set against right populism (p. 62), just as neoliberal co-
optation of sexual liberation is set against ‘neo-traditional homophobia’ (p.
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39), but Feminism for the 99% negates such ‘conflicts’. It ‘embodies a refusal
to choose sides in this battle’ (p. 62). As in Angela Last’s contribution to
Decolonising the University, refusal is politically configured as an affirmative
practice. Here refusal is everywhere. Their ‘kick-back feminism’ (p. 13)
revitalizes the strike as a revelatory action: ‘by making visible the indispensable
role played by gendered, unpaid work in capitalist society, [women’s strike activ-
ism] draws attention to activities from which capital benefits, but for which it
does not pay’ (p. 8).
5. Anti-Postmodernism: The Progress of This Storm
The opening salvo of Malm’s The Progress of This Storm: Nature and Society in a
Warming World is that global warming lays waste postmodernism’s narrative of
the relationship between time and space. If, for postmodernism, time has
collapsed into space—if the past and future have collapsed into a present
devoid of temporality—global warming is the antithesis of this: it ‘super-
charges our moment with time [. . .] it is a condition of time and nature
conquering ever more space. Call it the warming condition’ (pp. 7, 11, all
emphasis in original). But the real heart of this book is Malm’s systematic
examination of the relationship between ‘the natural’ and ‘the social’ in the
heat of our warming condition, an examination which begins with (and
ultimately comprises more than half of the book) a trenchant critique of
leading social-theoretical interpretations of this relationship.
According to Malm, social theory has not come to grips with the his-
torically unprecedented problems created by global warming. If anything, it
has exacerbated them: ‘just as the biosphere began to catch fire, social theory
retreated ever further from sooty matter, into the pure air of text’ (p. 21);
and, ‘global warming is not a discourse. It trivialises the suffering it gener-
ates to see it as a text. The excessive temperatures are not a piece of
rhetoric’ (p. 22). Concomitant with this is the rejection of nature, both as
an intelligible concept in its own right, and as an actually existing thing ‘out
there’: for Noel Castree, nature is a ‘‘‘particularly powerful fiction’’’, such
that ‘‘‘global climate change is an idea’’’ (p. 24); for Donna Haraway, it is ‘‘‘a
powerful discursive construction [. . .] a trope’’’ (p. 25); for Paul Wapner, it
is ‘‘‘not a self-subsisting entity’’ but ‘‘a contextualized idea’’, ‘‘an ideational
canvas’’, ‘‘a projection of cultural understandings’’, ‘‘a social construction’’’
(p. 26), and so forth. In sum, ‘what Castree espouses, and others with him,
is a form of constructionism about nature [. . .] [which] slides into the prop-
osition that nature [. . .] [comes] into the world through our ideas, and that
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no other nature exists. It is a constructionism of the idealist, neo-Kantian,
distinctly postmodernist brand’ (p. 27).
Malm staunchly defends a realist definition of nature. Drawing on Kate
Soper’s work, he is wedded to the idea that it is essential to ascribe inde-
pendence to nature itself, that ‘some sort of distinction between ‘‘society’’ and
‘‘nature’’ remains indispensable, both for research on the history of the fossil
economy and for climate science as such’ (p. 30). He takes issue with the
position (as advocated, for instance, by Bill McKibben and Steven Vogel) that
‘nature is now social all the way down’ (p. 31), that climate change signals
the end of nature, insofar as what is ‘natural’ today is irreducibly a human-
built environment. This is the constructionist position, an extreme idealism
and humanism that follows the specious logic that, as Malm puts it, ‘when
humans come into contact with a landscape, they necessarily change it; by
changing it, they build it; therefore humans have built all landscapes on
earth’ (p. 37). Apparently, ‘to affect matter is to build it’ (p. 37).
At a basic level, therefore, ‘society’ and ‘nature’ must remain analytically
distinguishable from one another, because they are actually distinct from one
another. However, and alongside constructionism, a theoretical ‘hybridism’
has emerged, one whose overriding conviction is that (1) ‘society’ and
‘nature’ are impossible to distinguish, and thus that (2) they are in fact
one and the same thing (p. 44). There is no more prominent voice
behind this position—who more than anyone else is the object of Malm’s
critique in The Progress of This Storm—than Bruno Latour. Latour believes that
nature and society have never been separated—hence distinguishable—‘in
any way, shape or form’ (p. 46), hence his renowned claim that ‘we have
never been modern’ (the concept of modernity as characterized by their
separation and distinguishability). Graham Harmon—‘Latour’s faithful
squire’ (p. 46) and leading figure in so-called ‘object oriented ontology’
and ‘speculative realism’—maintains this line. For Malm, however, the skel-
eton in the closet of hybridism is in fact an ‘extreme’ (p. 50) form of
Cartesian dualism (i.e. ‘substance dualism’, the notion that the mind and
body are utterly different things), which is ironic given the avowed hostility
of hybridist philosophers to Descartes. But, as Malm contends, hybridism is
simply the ‘flipside’ and ‘consequence’ (p. 51) of substance dualism, because
its assertion of the utter indistinguishability of nature and society—one
warranting their collapse as intelligible categories—is unconsciously predi-
cated on the (false) notion that they were utterly different in the first place:
‘only by postulating nature and society as categories located a universe apart does
their combination warrant their collapse’ (p. 49). Malm instead advances what he
calls ‘substance monist property dualism’—or ‘property dualism’ for
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short—because it allows for the relation between nature and society to be
one of both difference and dependence (pp. 53–55).
Just as, in the philosophy of mind, the mind is the domain of intentional
thought, something which is by no means reducible to the physical proper-
ties of the brain, there can, on the other hand, be no ‘mind’ without the
brain. In other words, ‘intentionality is an emergent property that cannot be
reduced to the bedrock on which it supervenes, and cannot exist without it.
All thought is actualised by events in the brain, and all thought has at least
one property the matter of the brain cannot have sensu strictu’ (p. 57). This is
the philosophical framework that Malm maps onto the nature–society rela-
tion, one that he views as consistent with the dialectical underpinnings of
historical materialism: ‘[Social] relations are exactly as material in substance
and utterly unthinkable outside of nature, but they also evince emergent
properties different from that nature’ (p. 58).
The political urgency of this property dualism—the ‘urgency to the study
of their difference-in-unity’ (p. 61)—is evident: we must maintain an ana-
lytical distinction between nature and society, because ‘only in this way can we
save the possibility of removing the sources of ecological ruin’ (p. 61). Only in this
way can we properly historicize what Malm calls ‘the fossil economy’, sys-
tematically detailed in his Fossil Capital: The Rise of Steam Power and the Roots of
Global Warming (2016). This analogical extension of the mind–body relation
to that between society and nature is not without its limits (Malm suggests
that ‘property pluralism’ (p. 71) may be a better designation than property
dualism, as the former allows for a multitude of ways in which climate
change is produced ‘right at the interface between society and nature’ (p. 71)),
but it is nonetheless useful for us to grasp what Malm calls ‘the paradox of
historicised nature’, which is to say ‘the more profoundly humans have shaped
nature over their history, the more intensely nature comes to affect their lives’ (p. 76).
The response to the ever-increasing imprint ‘the social’ makes upon ‘the
natural’ is not the utter indistinguishability of the two (hybridism), nor is it
the complete control of the natural by the social (constructionism), but
rather the vengeful growth of the natural as a distinct category in its own
right. But global warming is ‘more than the revenge of nature, this is the
revenge of historicity dressed in nature’ (p. 77).
Malm’s critique of hybridism is the most philosophically sophisticated of
Progress of This Storm (its most sophisticated critique is thus not of environ-
mental philosophy but the philosophy of mind), but he also dedicates con-
siderable attention to the cohort of theories known as ‘new materialism’,
which for all its internal differences is unified by the notion that matter
itself—matter qua matter—has agency: ‘matter is the active shaper of the
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world’ (pp. 79–80). Latour is once again singled out as a leading voice of this
school of thought. A cornerstone of Latour’s Actor-Network Theory is the
notion that objects ‘have as much agency as persons’ (p. 81), one echoed by
other new materialists such as Diana Coole and Jane Bennett (for whom
agency is shared among human and nonhuman ‘actants’ alike—a conceptual
replacement of agents). Malm’s rebuttal of these positions is straightforward:
to have agency is ‘intimately tied to having a mind’, the condition of possibility
of intentional acts (pp. 85–86). As Marx and many others maintain, only
human beings have the capacity for intentional thought, and therefore only
human beings, properly speaking, possess agency. Any theory that proceeds
from the stance that ‘anything and everything’ (p. 89) can have agency drifts
into mysticism, such that it is unintelligible (and politically dangerous) to
suggest, as Latour does, that rivers have agency and goals (p. 90). The fossil
economy is the social human origin and motor of global warming; social human
intentional acts (e.g. lighting coal on a fire) on and with matter, not matter itself,
are what bear responsibility for the warming condition. In short, as Malm puts
it, ‘the warming condition is hyper-human’ (p. 115).
Contra the interwoven positions of constructionism, hybridism, and new
materialism (whose sibling posthumanism is also ‘preoccupied with liquefy-
ing the wall between the human and the nonhuman’ (p. 114)), Malm ad-
vances a realist epistemology, or ‘climate realism’ (an admixture of climate
science and the critical realism largely inaugurated by Roy Bhaskar’s A Realist
Theory of Science (1995)), whose guiding principle is that ‘only on the con-
dition that the factuality of a warming world is independent of the science
can its claims be intelligible at all; the results of that science register what it
does not produce’ (p. 128). ‘Climate science is critical realism in practice’ (p.
130), and those positions that do not proceed from this premise (e.g. con-
structionism, hybridism, and new materialism) risk complicity with the re-
actionary ideologies of climate denialism overwhelmingly held by
conservative white men in power. Malm’s climate realism is explicitly social-
ist, and its tenets can be summarized as follows:
1.) social relations have real causal primacy in the development of
fossil energy and technologies based on it; 2.) by recursive loops of
reinforcement, these relations have been cemented in the obdurate
structure of the fossil economy; 3.) that totality has in its turn fired
up the totality of the earth system, so that (some) humans have real
reasons to be afraid. (pp. 148–49)
The politics of Malm’s socialist critical realism are militant: against For a
Left Populism and with Feminism for the 99%, it names that—capitalism—
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which must be superseded if nature and society are to survive. Historical
materialism is, as a consequence, the interpretative framework appropriate
to climate realism: philosophically, Marx’s analysis of the social–natural re-
lation is predicated on climate realism’s stance that, to quote Bhaskar,
‘‘‘knowledge follows existence, in logic and in time’’’ (p. 128); politically,
the logical and ontological separation (dialectically, that is) between society
and nature is what allows us to ‘identify [. . .] points for strategic interven-
tion’ (p. 173) in climate change. The separation between nature and society
is the condition of ‘revolutionary ecological practice’ (p. 174). It is this
separation—and metabolism—between the social and natural that allows
us to appreciate, as mentioned earlier, the paradox of historicized nature.
If this comes across as a ‘binary’ form of thinking and acting, this is because
In a world like this, where the contradictions between the apex of
wealth and the conditions supporting human existence are reaching
catastrophic intensity, the instinct of critical scholars should not be to
dissolve binaries, but to strive towards more radical polarisation so as to
clarify the stakes and gather the forces. If the politics of polarity and
oppositional ways of thinking are avoided, there will be peace on our
way into the abyss. Political warfare against an ever more pestiferous
ruling class demands manuals brimful with binaries. (p. 189)
For Malm, ‘labour and nature possess an ineradicable autonomy from
capital’, which is to say that both are ontologically (and chronologically)
prior to capital and both ‘[operate] according to their own laws’ (p. 197).
Drawing on the autonomist Marxist tradition, particularly Antonio Negri’s
work, and new currents in environmental philosophy and history, Malm
acknowledges that there are differences within this shared autonomy (e.g.
however conditioned—by capital, feudal relations, and so on—the labourer
always has some degree of agency, whereas the ‘appropriate formula’ for
nature is ‘autonomy without agency’ (p. 199)). However, from the perspective
of capital, and therefore from the perspective of the ongoing history of the
fossil economy, labour and nature converge around the same contradictory
axis. Capital is, on the one hand, defined by its incessant attempt to eman-
cipate itself from labour and nature: this is its inexorable drive towards
technological innovation and automation (machinery), which represents
the fantasy of the disappearance of the worker’s resistance and nature’s
autonomy (‘automatic machinery is introduced in the hope of annihilating
every residue of natural autonomy, of activating the potentialities of material
substrata in such a way as to provide capital with a fitting corporeal shape
that allows it to produce [. . .] without having to adapt to the swings and
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convulsions of external nature’ (pp. 200–01)). On the other hand, the ‘curse
of capital’ (p. 211) is that it can only achieve this by doubling down on its
dependence on labour and nature: it can only ‘emancipate itself from nature
in all its sparkling autonomy [. . .] by colonising it’ (p. 211). The same, of
course, goes for labour. Global colonialism it at the crux of both, historically
and today. Suffice to say, labour and nature ‘need to shake’ off capital; ‘both
have a capacity for ruling themselves, and the safest way to achieve not so
much a future of freedom as any future is to institute their full self-govern-
ment—a definition, if one so wishes, of sustainability’ (p. 212).
6. Conclusion
If Malm is correct in asserting that ‘the warming condition spells the death of
affirmative politics’, such that ‘negativity is our only chance now’ (p. 223),
then this constitutes a distinct problem for Mouffe’s cautious optimism that
‘an ambitious and well-designed ecological project could offer an attractive
vision of a future democratic society that might entice some sectors currently
within the neoliberal hegemonic bloc’ (p. 61). Mouffe suggests that ‘the
‘‘ecological question’’’ is ‘at the centre’ (p. 61) of the radicalization of
democracy. But Malm (not to mention Arruzza, Bhattacharya, and Fraser)
would balk at the notion that, as Mouffe has it, the neoliberal oligarchy
‘could be won over’ (p. 61) if and when ecology is brought to the forefront
of a counter-hegemonic movement against neoliberalism. For Malm, such a
politics of enticement—of ‘winning over’—is bankrupt: the now centuries-
old devotion of the ruling classes to the fossil economy, the utter indifference
of the 1 per cent to their massively disproportionate destruction of the
Earth, must be opposed by a radical politics appropriate to the coming
storm. ‘Dare to feel the panic’, Malm states, ‘then choose between the
two main options: commit to the most militant and unwavering opposition
to this system, or sit watching as it all goes down the drain’ (p. 226). For its
part, modern European philosophy would do well to experience an analo-
gous panic: commit to the most militant and unwavering opposition to the
neoliberal university, or. . .
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